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Motivation
Asymmetric Information
Morris (1997): “It is argued that proponents of subjective expected
utility have always understood that a ‘bid–ask spread’ in rational
individuals’ willingness to bet is consistent with SEU maximization in
the presence of private information.” - Morris (1997) “Risk
Uncertainty and Hidden Information”
SEU: bid-ask spread / ambiguity aversion not normatively appropriate
in Ellsberg experiments
subjects may use heuristics to avoid situations of disadvantageous
asymmetric information
Ellsberg bet is against the experimenter, and the experimenter
determines and knows the objective probabilities
Heuristic: avoid trade in situations of disadvantageous asymmetric
information
Motivation
1 Ellsberg: experimenter determines content of Ellsberg urn
2 Fox/Tversky: weather in Istanbul
3 Here: participants make the urn
A participant-generated Ellsberg urn
A participant-generated Ellsberg urn
1 Objective Urn
I Fair coin falls on Head or Tail.
2 Subjective Urn
I N participants in lab session (N=even in Study 1)
I every participant selects a ball marked with “Heart” or “Smiley”
I in your urn there are N-1 balls that can have “Heart” or “Smiley”
I “Heart” “Smiley” is just one symbol pair, we tried numerous
I order in which the symbols are mentioned is random
I Study 1: majority symbol decides bet (no ball drawn)
Study 2(pilot only): ball drawn from subjective urn
3 Bet
I You can bet on Head, Tail, “Heart”, “Smiley”
I Resolution of risk and uncertainty at the same time
I Order in which bets are displayed is randomized between
subjective/objective and symbol pairs are randomized
I People are explicitly told that symbol appearance is randomized
Instruction Screen (Study 1)
On a single screen people see the instructions, make choice about symbol
to send, and bet to choose:
Send a symbol (for you personally irrelevant, order randomized):
How much is each bet worth? You will receive the one you value most.
Focal point problem (Study 1)
Consider the experiment abstracting from bet on objective urn
Source of ambiguity is strategic uncertainty
No strategic uncertainty if coordination on a Nash equilibrium is
achieved
Here is the matrix form of the game for N=2
Capital letters = symbol sent; lower case letters = symbol bet on
(Hh) (Hs) (Sh) (Ss)
(Hh) (1,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(Hs) (0,1) (0,0) (1,1) (1,0)
(Sh) (1,0) (1,1) (0,0) (0,1)
(Ss) (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
4 pure-strategy NE: (Hh,Hh), (Ss,Ss), (Hs,Sh), (Sh,Hs).
Study 2 (pilot)
N even or odd, your urn has N−1balls in it
send H or S , bet on h or s
26 Nash equilibria in pure strategies
Prizes 0 , 1 (normalized)
c ∼ ( 12 ;0, 12 ;1)
ball is drawn from your subjective urn
a single coin flip for all participants (simultaneous)
Study 2: design (pilot)
Screen 1: Send symbol, bet
Screen 2: belief (non-incentivized, single prior)
Results - Study 1

















































































0 1 2 3 4
Smiley
Willingness to Pay
Heart - Smiley (1/2)
Heads Tails
Heart Smiley
Figure: Heart vs. Smiley 1/2











































































0 1 2 3 4
Smiley
Willingness to Pay
Heart - Smiley (2/2)
Heads Tails
Heart Smiley
Figure: Heart vs. Smiley 2/2














































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (1/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle
Figure: Large vs. Small Circle 1/3














































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (2/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle
Figure: Large vs. Small Circle 2/3
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Small Circle
Willingness to Pay
Large Circle - Small Circle (3/3)
Heads Tails
Large Circle Small Circle
Figure: Large vs. Small Circle 3/3












































































0 1 2 3 4
Up-Left Angle 
Willingness to Pay
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle 
Heads Tails
Up-Right Angle Up-Left Angle 
Figure: Upright vs. Upleft Angle
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Down-Right Angle
Willingness to Pay
Down-Left Angle - Down-Right Angle (1/2)
Heads Tails
Down-Left Angle Down-Right Angle
Figure: Dwon-Left vs. Down-Right Angle 1/2

















































































0 1 2 3 4
Down-Right Angle
Willingness to Pay
Down-Left Angle - Down-Right Angle (2/2)
Heads Tails
Down-Left Angle Down-Right Angle
Figure: Down-Left vs. Down-Right Angle (2/2)


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Full Ball 
Willingness to Pay
Empty Ball - Full Ball 
Heads Tails
Empty Ball Full Ball 
Figure: Empty vs. Full ball
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Empty Square 
Willingness to Pay
Filled Square - Empty Square 
Heads Tails
Filled Square Empty Square 
Figure: Filled Square vs. Empty Square


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Vertical Bar
Willingness to Pay
Horizontal Bar - Vertical Bar (1/2)
Heads Tails
Horizontal Bar Vertical Bar
Figure: Horizontal vs. Vertical Bar 1/2












































































0 1 2 3 4
Vertical Bar
Willingness to Pay
Horizontal Bar - Vertical Bar (2/2)
Heads Tails
Horizontal Bar Vertical Bar
Figure: Horizontal vs. Vertical Bar 2/2

















































































0 1 2 3 4
Up-Down 
Willingness to Pay
Left-Right - Up-Down 
Heads Tails
Left-Right Up-Down 



















































































0 1 2 3 4
White Number 
Willingness to Pay
Black Number - White Number 
Heads Tails
Black Number White Number 


















































































0 1 2 3 4
Theta 
Willingness to Pay
Phi - Theta 
Heads Tails
Phi Theta 
















































































0 1 2 3 4
Inverted Question Mark 
Willingness to Pay
Question Mark - Inverted Question Mark 
Heads Tails
Question Mark Inverted Question Mark 
Figure: Question Marks
Regression analysis
Results - Study 2 (5 sessions, very preliminary figures)





































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Down-Right Arrow - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Down-Left Arrow - Down-Right Arrow (Session 1/2, N = 30)
Down-Left Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Left Arrow (Subjective Urn)
Down-Right Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Right Arrow (Subjective Urn)
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Down-Left Arrow in Subjective Urn
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Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn
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Belief: Fraction of Down-Right Arrow in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Down-Right Arrow - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Down-Left Arrow - Down-Right Arrow (Session 2/2, N = 28)
Down-Left Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Left Arrow (Subjective Urn)
Down-Right Arrow (Objective Urn) Down-Right Arrow (Subjective Urn)
Chen/Schonger (ETH) No Asymmetric Info
Post_FUR, August 7, 2014 31 /
39




































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Up-Left Angle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle (Session 1/2, N = 30)
Up-Right Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Right Angle (Subjective Urn)
Up-Left Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Left Angle (Subjective Urn)
Chen/Schonger (ETH) No Asymmetric Info
Post_FUR, August 7, 2014 32 /
39





































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn
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Belief: Fraction of Up-Right Angle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn
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Belief: Fraction of Up-Left Angle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Up-Left Angle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Up-Right Angle - Up-Left Angle (Session 2/2, N = 28)
Up-Right Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Right Angle (Subjective Urn)
Up-Left Angle (Objective Urn) Up-Left Angle (Subjective Urn)
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Large Circle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Large Circle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Small Circle in Subjective Urn













0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Belief: Fraction of Small Circle in Subjective Urn
Bet Chosen: Small Circle - Subjective Urn
Beliefs about the Composition of Subjective Urn
Large Circle - Small Circle (Session 1/1, N = 30)
Large Circle (Objective Urn) Large Circle (Subjective Urn)
Small Circle (Objective Urn) Small Circle (Subjective Urn)
Chen/Schonger (ETH) No Asymmetric Info
Post_FUR, August 7, 2014 34 /
39
Regression 1
Table: Choosing Objective (0) vs Subjective Urn (1) - probit model
Belief [%] 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(0.00827) (0.00811) (0.00843) (0.00828)
Sending A 0.00911 0.0363 0.0460 0.0730
(0.253) (0.249) (0.259) (0.255)
Betting on A 0.225 0.218 0.410 0.409
(0.262) (0.259) (0.280) (0.278)
Objective urn displayed first 0.151 0.130
(0.227) (0.225)
Choice A displayed first -0.546∗ -0.542∗
(0.244) (0.243)
Symbol pairs FE Yes No Yes No
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regression 2
Table: Betting on A (1) vs on B (0) - probit model
Belief about % of sent A 0.0226∗∗ 0.0221∗∗ 0.0248∗∗ 0.0244∗∗
(0.00722) (0.00715) (0.00756) (0.00750)
Sending A 1.001∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.234) (0.243) (0.242)
Choosig subjective urn -0.0917 -0.0811 0.0230 0.0312
(0.235) (0.232) (0.243) (0.242)
Objective urn displayed first 0.0662 0.0627
(0.241) (0.241)
Choice A displayed first 0.792∗∗ 0.794∗∗
(0.243) (0.242)
Symbol pairs FE Yes No Yes No
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regression 3
Table: Bet choice - multinomial probit model
Objective-B Subjective-A Subjective-B
Sending A (d) -0.0542 0.367∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗
(0.0866) (0.0815) (0.0873)
Belief about % of sent A 0.00331 0.00873∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗
(0.00331) (0.00231) (0.00379)
Belief [%] -0.00433 -0.00137 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00321) (0.00227) (0.00377)
Objective urn displayed first (d) -0.0728 0.0178 0.0577
(0.0873) (0.0706) (0.0980)
Choice A displayed first (d) -0.00792 0.122 -0.310∗∗∗
(0.0859) (0.0687) (0.0902)
Observations 146 146 146
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Conclusion
eliminated asymmetric info: experimenter does not know, no single
other subject knows
evidence now consistent with probabilistic sophistication
(Machina/Schmeidler 1992)
future research: can subjects learn not to use heuristic even when
experimenter fills the urn?
part of larger trend: show where neoclassical econ holds (or is better
than thought)
research agenda: when is ambiguity aversion robust, when does it go
away by experience/imitation/feedback
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